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Abstract
In recent years, employment has fallen in the organised textile
sector despite an aggregate rise in output and capital. This paper
analyses the role of various factors that in
uence employment using 3-
digit classication of Indian textile industry from 1973-74 to 1997-98.
Our results document that the fall in employment can be explained in
terms of rise in wages, output shocks, lack of capital utilisation and
trade restrictiveness pertaining to Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA).
Environmental regulations enhance employment in the sub-sectors that
are most likely to be in
uenced by them. The results are robust to
dierent measures of capital, its utilisation and disaggregation to state-
level. We also illustrate that in a post-MFA regime, employment in
the sector is bound to increase owing to absence of trade restrictions
and prospects of huge investment in general and in complying with
environmental regulations, though the labour regulations might aect
the magnitude of that increase.
The author, a research scholar at IGIDR, would like to thank Dr. Kausik Chaudhuri,
Dr. Kirit. S. Parikh, Dr. K.V. Ramaswamy, Dr. Bibhas Saha, Dr. Subrata Sarkar
and other faculty members at Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research for their
valuable suggestions
11 Introduction
The Indian textile and clothing sector is the second largest employer
in India after agriculture, with more than 35 million persons engaged in it.
It contributes 5% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country,
30% to the total exports of India and 20% to our industrial production. By
virtue of being among the earliest established industries in the country and
being the key sector responsible for rapid growth of the newly industrialised
countries, textile industry takes a signicant role for the Indian economy.
In the recent years, the Indian textile industry had been facing a se-
vere recession in terms of employment, which continued despite fundamental
changes in tari structure among other policy aspects in the mid-1980s and
in 1991, though there are symptoms of recovery of late. The output, wages
and xed capital stock have been growing consistently during the past four
decades in real terms in the textile industry as a whole.1
The trend in the growth of employment is, however, not uniform. Though
employment has grown on an average after the reforms of 1991, this is
nowhere comparable to the growth of the other variables, especially that
of capital stock. This is even more transparent if we examine the period
from 1980-81 to 1997-98, when employment has fallen at approximately an
annual average rate at which output has grown, despite a remarkable an-
nual growth of capital of over 8%. It would seem from this that, as a whole,
textile industry is characterised by a substitutability between capital and
labour. Given the labour-intensive nature and unionised labour of the or-
ganised segment of this industry, entrepreneurs might have had capital to
substitute the labour. Even then, the absolute fall of 5% per year in the
employment when output has increased by 5% per year draws attention.
Table 2 shows that the textile industry, on an average, has precisely be-
come much less labour-intensive than it was thirty years ago. An unclear
trend in labour-capital ratio casts doubt about the existence of substitutabil-
ity between capital and labour. However, a rise in this ratio despite a fall
in capital productivity seems to suggest the existence of mere substitution
of labour by capital, though at an aggregate level, as explained by Ghose
(1994).
The fall in aggregate employment could have been partly because of the
1See Table 1 for this aspect.
2heterogeneity of the textile sector, that might render invalid the attribu-
tion of any characteristic to the aggregate industry. For example, despite
an existence of substitutability between capital and labour at an aggregate
level, rise in capital stock might have as well caused a rise in employment
owing to the fact that the former characteristic does not hold true for many
disaggregated sub-sectors within the textile industry. The observed fall in
employment, in addition, may be attributed to the changes in wages, shocks
in demand for the textile products, labour market structure, productivity,
degree of openness, tari structure, trade restrictions and various regula-
tions.
The major objective of the study is to determine the causes of fall in
employment in the organised segment of the Indian textile industry. The
questions that are required to be addressed for this purpose are to anal-
yse the eects of the factors mentioned above on employment in this in-
dustry and to examine the existence of tradeo between environment and
employment in the Indian textile industry, by determining the impacts of
environmental regulations on the employment. A dynamic panel framework
encompassing various sub-sectors and states to capture the eects structure
as well as state-specic factors of the industry is used, in order to capture
the existence of rigidities in the labour market.
Our results document the following. Wages have a negative eect on
the employment, implying the fact that employment in the textile sector
is more or less determined by the labour demand. The output demand
shock has a positive eect on employment, indicating the counter cyclical
nature of the markup in the Indian textile industry, implicitly hinting the
existence of imperfect competition in this industry. The positive eect of
capital stock is signicant in all estimated models, supporting the hypothesis
that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in the textile
industry is too small to counter the product demand elasticity. Moreover,
capital utilisation and liberalisation have positive eect on employment. We
also nd the existence of negative impact of labour regulations and customs
structure and positive impact of environmental regulations and phasing out
of MFA quotas on employment.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review
of literature. Section 3 develops a theoretical framework for this study.
Section 4 explains the data sources and variables. Section 5 elucidates the
3econometric methodology adopted and the results are given in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes with some policy implications.
2 Literature Review
Most of the empirical studies dealing with determinants of employment con-
centrates on the production function framework with cost minimisation, or
equivalently, prot maximisation. However, some researchers attempt to
pinpoint the eects of certain policy aspects and variables.
Bhalotra (1998b), using the data from organised manufacturing sector
from India, documents signicant positive eects of capital stock, lagged
employment and output change, and negative eects of manhours and pre-
vious period wages on the employment. However, the author claims that
beyond a threshold level, growth in manhours would enhance employment,
and hence it would terminate the puzzle of jobless growth in future.
However, Goldar (2000) shows that employment in organised manufac-
turing sector grew at 4.03 per cent per annum during the rst half of the
1990s; this growth has taken place despite the prevalence of unaltered statu-
tory regulations impacting on employment decisions of the rms, possibly
owing to the change in the size structure in favour of small and medium
industries and the slowdown in the growth in real wages.
Nagaraj (2004) shows a fall in employment of workers as well as their
earnings in the late nineties, which is attributed to employers' augmentation
of output by work intensication that pushes output towards the marginal
productivity curve, at the same time extending the frontier outwards by
augmenting capacity. Such a process was perhaps possible only when the
labour market is 
exible enough to accept the terms and conditions laid
down by employers. Deshpande and Sarkar (2004) and Debroy (1997) are
other major studies on labour 
exibility and reforms in India.
Fallon and Lucas (1993) studies the eects of job security legislations,
namely, the amendments done in 1976 and 1982 to the Industrial Disputes
Act of 1948, on dynamic labour demand in the industries that are covered
in census and sample sector of the Annual Survey of Industries in India.
The results show that the labour demand in the large scale industries suf-
fered more compared to the small scale units thus indicating the dependence
of the eects of regulations on the scale of operation as a notion of imple-
4mentability. Further, even among the large scale units, the negative eect of
job security legislation on employment is low with a relatively less unionised
labour force.
On the other hand, Ghose (1994) shows that employment in organised
manufacturing sector had been falling in the mid-1980s due to the increased
cost of labour as compared to that of capital resulting in a substitution of
labour by capital due to increased capital-intensive nature of the production.
Roy (1998a), analysing the ASI data for the period 1960-61 to 1993-94, nds
that job security regulations, considering both 1976 and 1982 amendments,
have not been responsible for slow down in employment growth.
Berman and Bui (2001) analyses the eects of environmental regulation
on the labour demand. This study estimates employment eects of sharply
increased air quality regulation in Los Angeles. The authors nd no evidence
that local air quality regulation substantially reduced employment, despite
allowing for induced plant exit and dissuaded plant entry, partly because
regulated plants are not in labour-intensive industries. Similarly, Goodstein
(2002) argues that there is no trade-o between environmental regulations
and jobs in USA at a macro level in the long run. The new jobs created for
implementation of regulations might more than compensate the job loss due
to them, as seen in the employment data of the USA.
Rana and Ramaswamy (2003) report a positive impact of trade liberali-
sation and degree of 
exibility of labour regulations across states and sectors
on the labour-demand elasticities in the Indian manufacturing sector. Ac-
cording to this study, the trade reforms of 1991 have positive eects on the
labour demand elasticity directly and indirectly through those on impacts
of degree of 
exibility of labour regulations.
Besley and Burgess (2004) investigate whether the industrial relations
climate in Indian states has aected the pattern of manufacturing growth
in the period 1958-92. They show that states which amended the Industrial
Disputes Act in a pro-worker direction experienced lowered output, employ-
ment, investment and productivity in registered or formal manufacturing
sector.
Dev (2000) examines the impact of economic liberalisation on employ-
ment and labour incomes in South Asia based on a Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) model. The results indicate a higher growth of employ-
ment in informal and private sectors despite a jobless growth in the 1980s.
5This indicates that labour rigidities have aected the employment growth.
However, growth rate of organised manufacturing sector has increased in the
post-reform period, while that of the unorganised part has fallen.
Uchikawa (2003) shows that though the removal of labour market rigidi-
ties that arise from reforms in India has caused a change in the structure of
the labour market. However, this has not necessarily resulted in a decline in
the employment. This is because of the enhanced investment owing to the
reduced regulations, which might have progressive eects on employment.
Unni (2003) suggests a post-reform shift of labour force from the organ-
ised to unorganised sector despite an existence of positive linkages between
them. However, Ramaswamy (2003) does not nd sucient evidence for
this hypothesis, since the dierentials in real wages are not widening.
Roy (2003) notes that the overall job loss in the organised sector was lim-
ited to certain industries with old roots and in old industrialised states in the
1990s. Most of the so-claimed decline in employment post-1991 was owing to
reallocation of labour from such sectors to protable sectors. The industries
that survived in declining sectors could do so by going for subcontract-
ing and plant-level bargaining. Further, taking a trade-union's perspective,
ILO-ARTEP (1989) argues that decline of employment in organised textile
sector in India was because of structural change as a result of product pref-
erences, modernisation and deliberate labour reduction by many mills to cut
costs.
Based on a eld survey, Howell and Kambhampati (1999) examine the
impact of liberalisation on labour in cotton textile mills of Ahmedabad.
With their small scale of production, poorer wages and working conditions
and lower tax payments, the powerlooms gave competition to composite
mills. Because of competition, many composite mills in India were closed
even before liberalisation. This phenomenon got accentuated after liberali-
sation, resulting in the closure of 82 per cent of all mills between 1994 and
1996 and 80 percent decline in the workforce.
From the above review, we infer that the growth of employment has
been falling in the Indian manufacturing sector on an average for about the
past three decades owing to real wage growth, various regulations, substi-
tution of labour by capital to some extent, low capital utilisation, and a
shift of the labour force from organised to unorganised segment of the man-
ufacturing sector. However, none of above-mentioned papers have focussed
6on the textile industry using sector-specic data. We, in this paper, have
tried to analyse this. Further, the uniqueness of this study lies in modelling
the eects of MFA quota utilisation, customs structure, labour and environ-
mental regulations on employment. In the following section, we develop a
theoretical model to justify our empirical exercise.
3 Theoretical Framework
This section is divided in two parts: rst develops a static model, whereas
the second one provides a dynamic version.
3.1 A Model of Static Prot Maximisation
The production function of a representative rm in the Indian textile sector,
with three inputs, namely capital stock (K), labour (L) and an index of
technical progress (A).2, is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas functional
form for simplicity3 From these inputs, environmental emissions (z) caused
by the production of the good (y) can be considered as a function of a
fraction  of the output, which is allocated for pollution abatement, as in
Copeland and Taylor (2003). Hence the production technology is given by:




where  : (0;1) ! (0;1) and 0() < 0.
This denition justies that higher allocation of resources in pollution
abatement results in lower level of emissions. For simplicity, a specic struc-
tural functional form is assumed for () given in equation (3), resulting in
equation (4), in conjunction with equation (1). As the environmental emis-
sions z are a function of the resources allocated to reduce pollution (),
an assumption that  is an increasing function (!(r)) of the environmental
regulation (r) 4, would lead to the equation (5).
2By dening A as an independent input, neither of the following is assumed: Neu-
tral (Y = Af(K;L)), capital-augmenting (Y = f(AK;L)) or labour-augmenting (Y =
f(K;AL))technical progress.
3Empirical Specications of Translog form have been tested and yielded poor results,
validating the choice of Cobb-Douglas form.
4Though Pargal and Huq (1997) nd no signicant impact of inspections on emissions
based on plant-level data from 1990 to 1994, Kathuria (2004) shows evidence for the impact







The prot maximisation problem of the representative rm, assuming
an imperfect competition, is given in equation (6). The rst-order condition
with respect to employment is given by equation (7) and is simplied to
equation (8) by taking the price elasticity of output as  and the nominal
costs of labour, capital and emissions controlled (E) as W, i and c respec-
tively.
max = p!(r)(AKL
)(1 )   WL   iK   c!(r) (6)

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) = W (8)
Equation (8) assumes price setting5 and perfect labour market that fa-
cilitate the choice of wages to be considered as a result of the prot max-
imisation problem. In a study that estimates the determinants of employ-
ment, nominal wages, prices, and labour force by using a dynamic simultane-
ous equations model across seven states of Australia, Chaudhuri and Sheen
(2003) take price change as endogenous. However, according to Fallon and
Lucas (1993), this framework may not be relevant for Indian context, since
the quasi-xed factor demand functions need not depend on prot max-
imisation problem. Wages are mostly determined as a result of collective
or tripartite bargaining, prices by market interactions and labour force by
various socio-economic as well as demographic factors in India.
However, we can relax this assumption by incorporating rigidities R,
capturing all the distortions in the labour market including the dierence
between the market wages and actual wages. Given this, we obtain equation
(9) by taking  as mark-up.6
of informal or media-based regulation on pollution in Gujarat, substantially validating this
assumption.
5Chakrabarti (1977), Chatterji (1989) and Bhalotra (1998a) provide evidence for exis-
tence of mark-up-based price setting in Indian industries.




and is a function of demand shock 
e.
8The rigidities R may arise due to the presence of the labour regulations
and expenditure incurred in social security directly and or because of the
trade restrictions (or liberalisation leading to their reduction) indirectly as
their restrictive eect on the institutional features of the labour market may
aect employment and wages.7 The partial derivative of output with respect
to employment is given in equation 10 in terms of the real wages expressed
as w.
Expanding equation (10) using the explicit expression of
y
L, which is
given in equation (11), the labour demand function can be obtained as























From equation (1), the elasticities of output with respect to labour, cap-
ital and technical progress, denoted by L, K and T are 
,  and  multi-












To examine the comparative statics, it would be useful to observe that
the elasticities of output with respect to capital and labour are positive and
less than unity, as empirically observed8, and that to technical progress need
not be positive, 9, though it may be expected to be so. If the rst term in
7For example, Dutta (2004) nds that the impact of protection on the inter-industry
wage premia is substantially positive. Workers employed in industries with high taris
receive higher wages than apparently identical workers in low tari industries.
8Based on the regressions of logarithm of output against that of capital and that of
labour force
9This is because of the fact that there is no variable that captures it explicitly, ne-
cessitating the use of time dummies to capture, which have positive/negative eects for
dierent years
9equation 13 is denoted by a constant a and 1
1 L is denoted by b10, equation
(13) can be simplied as follows:
L = a(Rw(e)) b(!(r)ATKK)b (14)
The partial derivatives of the labour demand function with respect to
wages, capital, technical progress, demand shock, labour regulations, trade
restrictions and environmental regulations can be derived from equation (14)
and presented in equation (15) - equation (20). From equation (15), we can
infer that labour demand is clearly decreasing in wages.11 As long as the
elasticity of output to labour demand is less than one, increase in wages
should result in fall in employment.
L
w
= a( b)w b 1(R(e)) b(!(r)ATKK)b < 0 (15)
The partial derivative of labour demand with respect to rigidities (as in
equation (16)) reveals that labour demand is decreasing in rigidities caused
by labour regulations and trade restrictions. The reason is that as long as
the elasticity of output to labour demand is less than one, increase in the




= a( b)R b 1(w(e)) b(!(r)ATKK)b < 0 (16)
Eect of technical progress on employment depends on the elasticity
of output with respect to technical progress (T), as shown in equation
(17), which may be positive or negative. In fact, as Bhalotra (1998b) notes,
labour-augmenting technical progress would have ambiguous eect on labour
demand while capital-augmenting or neutral technical progress would be
expected to have positive eect on it. Since the type of technical progress
itself may vary over years, this needs to be determined empirically.
10Note that a and b are always positive




Eect of capital on employment depends on two eects, namely, the
positive elasticity of output with respect to capital and the ambiguous ef-
fect of technical progress on labour demand, as shown in the two terms in
equation (18). While the former is a clear indication of complementarity be-
tween capital and output, the latter oers an explanation for substitutabil-
ity of labour by capital, assuming that technical progress is increasing in
capital and labour demand is decreasing in technical progress or technical
progress is decreasing in capital and labour demand is increasing in techni-
cal progress.12. Hence, examination of existence of complementarity between









Environmental regulations may cause a fall or rise in labour demand
based on whether labour demand is increasing or decreasing in emissions,
since we can assume the latter to be as a decreasing function of environmen-







To explain the eect of environmental emissions on labour demand, their
eect on other variables in this framework should be known. Porter's hy-
pothesis states that their reduction would enhance technical progress and
output by means of reduced costs and increased eciency in production.
However, emissions may also be reduced by lockouts or reduction in pro-
duction of polluting output, thus making the eect of emissions on output
ambiguous. Compliance with the regulation might lead to higher employ-
ment because of the requirement of labour in the activities of abatement
and control of pollution for compliance. Whether capital is decreasing or
12If
L
A < 0 and
A
K > 0 or if
L
A > 0 and
A
K < 0, term 2 in equation (18) is an
indication of substitutability of labour by capital
11increasing in emissions is an empirical issue, since controlling the emissions
may lead to lockouts or investments to abate. In short, eect of environ-
mental regulations depends on its eect on output, capital and technical
progress. If Porter's hypothesis holds, then L
!(r) < 0, then labour demand
is increasing in environmental regulations. On the other hand, if the en-
vironmental regulations are restrictive and distortional in nature, labour
demand is decreasing in environmental regulations.
Demand shock aects employment through the cyclicity of markup, as
shown in equation (20). If mark up is countercyclical, then a positive de-
mand shock is reinforced by means of a decreased markup so as to raise
the employment and a negative demand shock is worsened because of an
increased markup, consequently reducing the employment. This is in line
with the inference from the equation (20) that if 0(e) < 0, then L
e > 0
as  b < 0. Similarly, a procyclical markup would result in demand shock
aecting the employment negatively.
L
e = a(Rw) b( b)(e) b 10(e)(!(r)ATKK)b (20)
A logarithmic transformation of equation (14) gives us econometrically
estimable specication, including mandays (logd) as a control variable, with
i and t representing the sub-sector and time respectively as:13
logLit = 0 + 1logwit + 2logkit + 3dlogyit + (21)
4rjit + 5lkit + 6logdit + i + 
t + uit
In equation (14), labour demand was expressed in terms of capital and
other factors, implicitly assuming that the level of capital is determined
exogenously. This is capital-constrained model of employment. Alterna-
tively, we may assume that the level of output is exogenous leading to an
output-constrained model of employment.
13We assume that the markup is a linear function of demand shock 
e without intercept
( = 
e), exponential change in output (yt=yt 1) to be a proxy for the demand shock

e, the environmental emissions !(r) to be an exponential function of the dummies for
environmental regulation rj (!(rj) = e
rj), index of technical progress to be an exponential
function of time (Ait = e

t)and labour market rigidity to be an exponential function of
various proxies and dummies for labour regulation and trade restriction/liberalisation lk
(R = e
lk) used in the study.
12Output-constrained model of employment can be derived using equation
(13), by multiplying the numerator and denominator of the left hand side
by L
L













Comparative statics for the output-constrained model of employment is
simpler than that for the capital-constrained one, as can be inferred from
equation (23), because of the fact that constraining for output renders the
inclusion of most variables in the system redundant. As shown in equation















Unlike in the capital-constrained model, the eect of demand shock on
employment is not unambiguous in the output constrained model. The rst
term in equation (26) can be negative or positive depending on whether the
markup is procyclical or countercyclical, while the second term is positive
as long as the output is increasing in demand shock, which is bound to be
the case. If the positive eect of demand shock on output is high enough
to outweigh its possible direct negative eect in case markup is procyclical,









The eect of rigidities that arise from labour regulations and trade re-
strictions is clearly negative, as seen in equation (27). This is because of
the direct eect re
ected by the rst term as well as the indirect eect,












13Since the model has considered a representative rm for a time period,
there are bound to be sub-sector-specic and time-specic xed eects, cap-
tured by i and 
t, respectively. If the labour demand is output-constrained,
the following specication would result from equation (23):
logLit = 0 + 1logwit + 2logyit + 3dlogyit + (28)
4rjit + 5lkit + 6logdit + i + 
t + uit
3.2 A Dynamic Model of Prot Maximisation with Adjust-
ment Costs of Labour
In Indian textile industry, the constraints on ring an employee, that may
lead to redundant labour, coupled with the general cyclicality in the indus-
try in terms of booms and recessions, necessitate the modelling the prot
maximising behaviour in a dynamic framework. Here the rm would be
concerned about the present value of future prots till a time period t1.14
The discounting factor q can be considered to be the sum of actual discount
rate and the rate of job separation/hiring that costs the rms. Moreover, an
explicit functional specication of the costs involved in the adjustment to
new employment (C( _ Lt))15, arising out of regulations among other factors,










t )(1 )   WtLt   itKt   ctEt   C( _ Lt)]e qtdt(29)
C( _ Lt) = aj _ Ltj + bj _ Ltj2 : a;b > 0(30)
Assuming that the prot maximisation decision does not take capital and
emissions explicitly into consideration, since the former can be considered as
being primarily dictated by the industrial licensing process16 and the latter
as a function of regulation.17 For a dynamic optimisation problem18, the
path equation has to be dened for the state variable, which is, in this model,
14This assumes Markov Decision Process.
15Note that C( _ Lt) > 0;C
0( _ Lt) > 0;C"( _ Lt) > 0 and C(0) = 0: Gould (1968) proves that
this specication captures the higher costs associated with more rapid changes in labour.
16Fallon and Lucas (1993) and Mathur (1989) argue this for Indian manufacturing,
holding good for textiles also.
17Mani and Huq (1996) nd that costs of compliance to environmental regulation are
not as high as to in
uence the choice of location. Similarly, to the extent that this can
be extended to prot maximisation, emissions that depend on compliance with regulation
can be taken as exogenous.
18For a detailed description on this, see Intriligator (2002) and Hoy et al. (2001).
14labour. Following Gould (1968), under the assumption of static expectations
about wages and prices, this can be specied as:
_ Lt = 
[L   Lt] : 
 > 0 (31)
The above equation re
ects a partial adjustment mechanism. The con-
trol variable in this model is the rate of growth of labour _ Lt. Given this,
the Hamiltonian function can be expressed as:







 WtLt   itKt   ctEt   C( _ Lt)]e qt + (t) _ Lt
We assume that the rst term in H(Lt; _ Lt) is dierentiable and jointly
concave in Lt and _ Lt and _ Lt is linear in Lt. From equation (29), we get:
H(:)
 _ Lt





L(0) > 0;(t1) = 0 (35)
Solving equations (33) and (34) and applying the steady state conditions
at t = 0, we obtain equation (36). The equilibrium employment is given in
equation (37) implying that _ Lt =  Lt = 0.







Approximating the growth rate in labour in the form of dierences and
then simplifying by taking t = 1 and the rigidities R = aq=p, the functional
form of dynamic capital-constrained model of employment can be expressed
as equation (39). Comparative statics of equation (39) demonstrate that
labour demand is decreasing in wages and rigidities and increasing in the
lag of employment, while the eects of other variables depend on various



















Further, the dynamic output-constrained model of employment can be
derived by rst getting the equilibrium level of employment in terms of
output and other variables from equation (37) given by equation (40) and

















Let lkit represent all the proxies and dummies that represent a and q,
capturing social security aspects and labour market rigidities respectively.
Taking a logarithmic transformation and expressing a part of the rst lag of
labour in terms of other variables would result in the following econometric
specication:




+4rjit + 5lkit + 2
j=16jlogLit j + 2
j=07jlogdit j + i + 
t + uit
A Specication corresponding to the static form of output-constrained
model would be as follows:




+4rjit + 5lkit + 2
j=16jlogLit j + 2
j=07jlogdit j + i + 
t + uit
4 Data Sources and Description
For this study, 32 sub-sectors19 have been chosen for the textile industry,
whose three- digit aggregate national data were obtained from the Annual
Survey of Industries (1973-74 to 1997-98). They were broadly classied
under six groups, namely, cotton, wool, silk, jute, synthetics and others
19The detailed list of these can be obtained on request, though they have not been
shown here to save space
16irrespective of the actual two-digit National Industrial Classication (NIC-
1987). This was done to control for the eects of more relevant groups of
sub-sectors. Of these, 8 sub-sectors are in the cotton group, 4 are in wool
group, 3 are in the silk group, 3 are in man-made bres group, 6 in the
jute group and 8 in the others. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
employment in terms of total persons engaged in the sub-sector.
The independent variables are invested capital stock de
ated by the price
index of textile machinery, change in output (in particular, change in the
logarithm of the gross value of output) as a proxy for demand shock, wages
per person engaged in production per year de
ated by the sub-sector-specic
price index. The data for price indices of dierent sub-sectors was collected
from Chandok and Group (1990) and various statistical publications of the
union ministry of labour. The de
ator (with 1981 as base year) used for
capital stock is the WPI of textile machineries, that used for wages is the
CPI for industrial labourers (All India as well as dierent states), and that
used for the output is the commodity specic WPI approximated for the
two-digit and three digit NIC-1987. This way of de
ating dierent variables
using dierent indices is consistent with Balakrishnan and Pushpangadan
(1998), who advocate this double-de
ator method.
We work with natural logarithm of all the variables. In addition to the
all-India three-digit industries, four two-digit industries (codes 23 to 26) for
19 states from 1979-80 to 1997-98 are analysed. Measuring capital stock has
always been a contentious issue. Though the perpetual inventory method
being followed by many researchers, according to Ray and Bhattacharya
(2003), this does not take care of both the problems, as inclusion of de-
preciation is not reliable as it is mostly reported as an accounting identity,
however exclusion of it gives rise to an incomplete measure.
Book Value of capital stock, which is available in the ASI database, may
be poorly correlated with the actual capital stock. The measure of capital
stock, as required for any study based on production function, should be
that of the actually utilised part, which necessitates the exclusion of the idle
capital.
We proceed by considering the total invested capital20 (Kgit) that is
20Other measures including Gross and Net Fixed Assets, Gross Productive Capital
and Net Capital Stock calculated by implicit de
ator method were found to be highly
correlated with each other. Results are robust to the use of dierent measures.
17the sum of physical and working capital and then subtracting depreciation
(dgit) from this, resulting in the net invested capital (NKgit). Utilised part
of net invested capital is then obtained by multiplying this by the capacity
utilisation rates (Ugit). This exercise is summarised in the equations below:
NKgit = Kgit   dgit (44)
UNKgit = NKgit  Ugit (45)
Two dierent measures of capacity utilisation are developed and used
in this study. One of them uses the data from various annual books of the
compendium of textile statistics, handbook of textile statistics and manmade
bre statistics. The nal measure of capacity utilisation was obtained only
for four categories: cotton spinning, cotton weaving, cotton textiles and
synthetic bres. For cotton spinning, it is the ratio of average operating
spindles per shift to the total installed spindles. For cotton weaving, it is
the ratio of average operating looms per shift to the total installed looms. In
the case of man-made bres, it is the average ratio of the total production
to the total installed capacity of production of viscose, polyester, nylon,
polypropylene and acetate.
This measure of capacity utilisation developed for the aforementioned
sectors was then used as proxy for that of each of the dierent sub-sectors
and for those for which they were clearly found not to be matching, it was
assumed to be one. This also assumes that the dierences in the utilised
capacity during dierent shifts in a day can be ignored, validating the use
of their average to develop this measure. Another measure of capacity utili-
sation is more rigorous and is constructed from the data available based on
the following equations that contain all variables in their real terms. They
clearly dene capacity utilisation for any year and sub-sector as the output-
capital ratio for that year expressed as a percentage of the maximum output
per capital achieved for that sub-sector over time.
Y Kgit = Ygit=Kgit (46)
MAXY Kgi = max(Ygit=Kgit) (47)
Ugit = Y Kgit=MAXY Kgi (48)
18Apart from these variables, in dierent regressions, time dummies, group
dummies, sub-sector dummies and post-1991 dummies have also been in-
cluded. To capture the eects of trade liberalisation, degree of openness
for dierent sub-sectors for the period of analysis have been included by an
interpolation of available data in Pandey (1999). The degree of openness
are in terms of ratio of imports to the GDP, ratio of the sum of exports and
imports to the GDP and the Trade Competitiveness Index (TCI). Apart
from these, an average of the last two measures has also been tried as a
proxy for degree of openness. Interaction dummies formed by the products
of all these dummies and wages have been included in some specications.
However, since the interpolation exercise may be questionable and none
of these indices t in the specic scenario of textile trade that involves MFA
quotas, two additional measures of trade liberalisation or restrictiveness that
are specic for the Indian textile industry have been used. One of them is
the average percentage utilisation of MFA quotas of apparel exports from
India.
We expect to test the proposition that that higher the apparel quota
utilisation, higher is the output in most sub-sectors in the textile sector
and hence the higher is the employment. If this is true, it can be inferred
that with the phasing out of quotas, employment is bound to increase as
there would be less or no quotas to begin with. The second measure is the
customs duties collected per unit production of dierent sub-sectors. This
re
ects, to a large extent, the aspect of distortions to trade owing to the tari
structure. The lower the average customs duty, the higher is the degree of
trade liberalisation. The data on MFA quota utilisation rates was collected
from dierent sources, including Uchikawa (1998), Sastry (1984) and Jain
(1988), which, in turn, have cited the issues of statistics of trade published
by Apparel Export Promotion Council (AEPC).
As for the variables pertaining to labour regulations, dierent variables
were constructed for this study. One of them, following Downes (2002), is
the ratio of total non-wage benets to the average emoluments per person
engaged. Secondly, the index of labour regulation developed by Besley and
Burgess (2002) for dierent states has been used. The other variables include
the dummies for dierent years in which there were signicant changes in
the labour regulations in the country, as mentioned in Ministry of Labour
19(2004).21
Owing to lack of a comprehensive data for the environmental regulations
and their implementation in the Indian textile industry, we proceed as fol-
lows: the rst set of dummies for the environmental regulation based on
the Environment Act (1986) (denoted as envreg1) and the ban on Azo dyes
(denoted as polln1) imposed by Germany in 1996, equals one for those
sub-sectors that directly come under these regulations. We also create
another set of dummies treating all sub-sectors equally (denoted by envreg
and polln respectively), assuming inter-linkages of the eects. The signi-
cance of the eects of latter set coupled with the insignicance of those of
the former set would mean that environmental regulation has not aected
the entire textile sector, but only a small section of it.
5 Methodology
Our estimation equation follows directly from the model as outlined in sec-
tion 2.22 The four basic models estimated23 in this study are specied in
section 2.
Baltagi (2001) notes the possibility of least squares estimation being
inecient owing to the presence of rst order autocorrelation in the error
term for a model with lagged dependent variable and to the correlation of
the lagged dependent variable with the individual heterogeneity term. The
`within' transformation results in biased estimates. However, in absence of
second-order autocorrelation in the errors, the Generalised Methods of Mo-
ments (GMM) gives ecient estimates. Arellano and Bond (1991) present
specication tests for the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) esti-
mation of dynamic panel data. The GMM estimator is signicantly more
21Some of them are Payment of Gratuity Act 1972, Equal Remuneration Act 1976,
Interstate Migrant Workmen Act 1979, Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act
1986, Labour Laws(Exemption from Furnishing returns and Maintaining Registers by
certain Establishments) Act 1988 and Employees' Pension Scheme 1995.
22DPD package of the OX console software was extensively used in addition to Stata.
See Doornik and Ooms (2001) for an introductory guide to Ox Console Software.
23Before estimating, Johansen's cointegration and Vector Auto Regression (VAR) anal-
ysis of capital, output, labour and TFP were done for the aggregate textile industry from
1960 to 2000. Though no long-run relationship could be established between employ-
ment and other variables, impulse response functions suggest a `dynamic' substitutability
between capital and labour and a positive eect of output shock on employment. Fur-
ther, existence of a long-run relationship between output and capital validates the use of
output-constrained and capital-constrained models to check the robustness of the results.
20ecient than the Instrumental Variable (IV) method24, as it uses all po-
tential instruments and produces well-determined estimates in the dynamic
panel data models.
Ahn and Schmidt (1995) and Ahn and Schmidt (1997) show that Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) has not used a few additional moment restrictions
under the standard assumptions of dynamic panel data model. Wansbeek
and Bekker (1996) show that adding moment restrictions minimises the e-
ciency loss of the GMM estimator as compared to the Maximum Likelihood
(ML) estimator. Blundell and Bond (1998) shows that the estimation of the
dynamic error component model is a better alternative to the standard rst
dierenced GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). It is the system
GMM estimator deduced from a system of equations in rst dierences and
in levels. This estimator is dened under extra moment restrictions that
are available under reasonable conditions relating to the properties of the
initial condition process. Exploiting these extra moment restrictions oers
eciency gains and permits the identication of the eects of time invariant
variables.
Further, Blundell et al. (2000), Blundell and Bond (2000) and Judson
and Owen (1999) present theoretical arguments as well as empirical exercise
including Monte-Carlo evidence to prove that the system GMM estimator,
which relies on relatively mild restrictions on the initial condition process,
is asymptotically more ecient25 than the standard GMM estimator.
In fact, Alvarez and Arellano (2003) proves that GMM estimators are
consistent when T=N ! c 2 (0;2] and more importantly, they are less biased
than Within-Group estimators if T < N, which is the characteristic of the
data used in this study. Though there are numerous bias-correction methods
such as those developed by Kiviet (1995), Kiviet (1999), and Bruno (2004),
these are for models with low T and much higher N, which may, for example,
hold good for short time-series rm-level data and not for longer time-series
sub-sectorwise data, such as that used in this study. Carree (2001) develops
a method to estimate almost unbiased estimator for a dynamic panel data
model, which, however, does not contain any exogenous variable and hence
unsuited for this study. Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002) gives the bias for
24See, for example, Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982)
25Wansbeek (2001) provides estimators that are more ecient if there are serious mea-
surement error in the variables.
21instrumental variable estimation of dynamic panel model when both n and
T are large, which again does not hold for this study as both of these are
less than 50 for the data used here.
An interesting study by Hayakawa (2005) shows that system GMM is
estimator less biased that rst-dierencing and level-GMM estimators be-
cause of the fact that the bias of the former is a weighted sum of the biases
in opposite directions of the latter ones. He further notes that if the coef-
cient on the lagged dependent variable is around 0:5, then system GMM
estimator is much less biased than others. Hence, we use the system GMM
estimation for this study and the two equations that we estimate are (42)
and (43), respectively for capital- and output-constrained employment mod-
els, in addition to these equations expressed in dierences. We examine the
validity of the estimated models using the specication tests.26
The two-step GMM estimators, despite being more ecient than their
one-step counterparts, result in downward biased estimates of standard er-
rors.27 A nite sample correction method developed by Windmeijer (2005)
is used in this study to work out the standard errors of the two-step esti-
mates. We dene valid instruments and instrument matrices28 for the lagged
dependent variable.
However, Alvarez and Arellano (2003) notes that there is no real advan-
tage of GMM when T and N are of a similar dimension, and that within-
groups is clearly better when T > N.29 Further, Bun and Kiviet (2005)
notes that in small samples of models with dynamic feedbacks, method of
moments and least squares estimates are biased, as the former is more bi-
ased with higher number of moment conditions employed. Hence, most of
the results obtained from system GMM estimation are cross-checked with
the bias-corrected within group estimates, using Bruno (2004).30 We set
26Hansen's Over-identication test statistic is asymptotically distributed as 
2 under the
null of instrumental validity with as many degrees of freedom as there are overidentifying
restrictions. AR(2) statistic is distributed as standard normal under the null of no second
order autocorrelation.
27Alternatively, consistent testing procedures developed by Andrews and Lu (2001)
could be used if the sample size is high.
28However, choosing the optimal number of instruments has not been done this study,
because the theoretical literature pertaining to this issue does not consider GMM methods.
See, for example, Donald and Newey (2001).
29Author is grateful to Prof. Arellano for his personal clarication on this issue by
e-mail.
30Clarications provided on this issue by J. Kiviet and F. Windmeijer to the author
by e-mail, as well as the code of Stata program xtlsdvc.ado, provided by G. Bruno are
22this bias correction method to use Anderson and Hsiao (1982) for initial
estimators, to run 100 repetitions for bootstrapping standard errors, as-
suming normal distribution, and to correct the bias with the accuracy of
approximation being of order 1=NT. This is to incorporate the fact that
invoking higher-order terms yields some minor improvements in dynamic
panel models with exogenous regressors when N and T are 2 digit numbers,
as documented by Bun and Kiviet (2003).
To test for the for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of our
panel-data model while performing the estimation given by Bruno (2004), we
follow the method discussed by Wooldridge (2002). Drukker (2003) presents
simulation evidence that this test has good size and power properties in
reasonable sample sizes.
6 Results
The results for the static panel data model (equation (21)), although not
reported,31 show that the wage (logwit) has negative eect, consistent with
the theory. The demand shock (dlogyit) has positive eect, revealing a
counter-cyclical markup. The capital stock (logkit) also has a positive ef-
fect. However, the estimation the static model is not appropriate given the
presence of signicant rst-order as well as second-order autocorrelation.
Further, the problem of omission of dynamic eects arising out of adjust-
ment costs would not be eliminated even if we control for autocorrelation.
Hence, the dynamic model of employment needs to be estimated, following
the theory discussed in section 3.2.
Tables 3 to 6 contain the results of the dynamic panel data regressions
using system GMM method. In all these tables, it should be noted that
the instruments are valid as revealed by the Hansen's over-identication
test and the autocorrelation is present at the rst order and absent at the
second order, as required for the validity of this technique.
In all these regressions, dierent measures of capitalstock and capacity
utilisation, which have been mentioned in section 4, have been used and
the results are almost similar for all the alternative measures. However, for
the sake of uniformity, in all the results reported, logkit represents gross
acknowledged with thanks.
31It is available on request from the author.
23capital stock and util represents the measure of capacity utilisation that
is constructed based on capital-output ratio. Further all these regressions
were carried out by dening the rst lag of lognit and levels of other major
variables, whose lags are also included, have been dened as GMM-style
instruments for both level and dierence equations and the other variables,
whose lags are been included, have been dened as IV-style instruments.
Table 3 presents the results of estimation of the Capital Constrained
Employment Model using All-India Three-Digit Data. Column 1 shows the
results with only group dummies included in addition to the major variables
of this model. These results show that employment depends signicantly on
two of its lags, demand shock and capital stock positively. 32 The coecients
of lags of dependent variables (LDVs) are positive.33 The impact of wages
on employment is negative and signicant, indicating that employment in
textile industry is more or less demand-driven. These results are robust to
including year dummies in addition to group dummies (Column 2), year
dummies and capital utilisation (Column 3). Column 3 also shows that
environmental regulation has signicantly enhanced employment, which is
an observation consistent with Goodstein (2002), indicating the validity of
Porter's hypothesis. The results of Column 4 shows that manhours have
negative insignicant eect on employment and is consistent with Nagaraj
(2000).34 Given the dimension of N and T in our case, we also present the
results of bias-corrected LSDV estimation, based on Bruno (2004), in the
last column. The results are consistent with the previous results and further
shows that capital utilisation positively in
uences employment.35
Table 4 presents the results of estimation of the Output Constrained
Employment Model using All-India Three-Digit data. The results broadly
show that employment depends signicantly on one or more of its' own lags,
demand shock and output or on its lag positively, though not in all cases.
The eect of wages on employment is negative and signicant. While column
2 and 3 show that the ban on azo dyes has aected employment negatively,
32It should be noted that the signs of lags of other variables are not interpreted in most
cases as we use them mainly as control variables.
33This rules out serious classical measurement errors and bias due to an unobserved
time-variant co-founder, explained in Mckinnish (2005).
34Nagaraj (2000) nds that the multicollinearity between wages and manhours aects
the results if both are included simultaneously as the determinants of employment.
35The presence of AR(1) validates bias-correction method being used instead of simple
within group or LSDV estimates.
24domestic environmental regulation36 appears to have signicantly promoted
employment, (as reported in column 4 and to some extent in columns 2 and
3). We also note that reforms of 1991 in the Indian economy seem to have
enhanced employment (column 2).
Our results so far show that quota utilisation and customs structure do
not have signicant eects. We attribute this to the fact that these variables
as constructed is available for 2-digit industry. Given this, we perform a
state-wise 2-digit level analysis. This also allows us to account for spatial
heterogeneity and increasing the number of cross-sections. However, this
data is available for the period between 1980-81 and 1996-97.
Table 5 presents the results of estimation of the Capital Constrained
Employment Model using the state-wise two-digit data. Most of the results
are consistent with the results of Tables 3 and 4. However, this analysis gives
additional interesting results emerge: Firstly, lags of loghit has signicant
negative eect in most results in Table 5, showing that the increased utili-
sation of labour negatively in
uences employment, as explained in Bhalotra
(1998b). Secondly, the labour regulations, as measured by the index devel-
oped based on Besley and Burgess (2002) and World-Bank (2002), have a
signicant negative eect on employment. Thirdly, quota utilisation and the
dummy for phasing out of MFA quotas have signicant positive eects, while
customs structure has a negative signicant eect on employment. This re-
sult is consistent with the fact that the removal of rigidities would enhance
employment. Table 6, showing the results of estimation of the Output-
Constrained Employment Model using the state-wise two-digit data, also
supports most of the previous results.
In sum, we can infer the following. There is a rigidity in employment
in India's textile sector. The negative eect of wages on the employment
points towards the fact that employment in the textile sector is more or
less determined by the labour demand. The output demand shock has a
positive eect on employment indicating the counter cyclical nature of the
markup in the Indian textile industry, implicitly hinting the existence of
imperfect competition in this industry. The positive eect of capital stock
is signicant in all estimated models, supporting the hypothesis that the
36Note that, as already mentioned in section 4, envreg1 and polln1 are dummies specic
to polluting sub-sectors , signicance of whom indicates that environmental regulations
have aected employment in them, but not necessarily the entire textile industry
25elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in the textile industry
is too small to counter the product demand elasticity.
Table 7 shows the average long-run elasticities of employment to capi-
tal, output, wages, demand shock and actual manhours. Adjustment speed
of employment to shock is found to be around two years, indicating the
existence of rigidity in employment. Estimates and standard errors were
calculated from the LSDV-BC regressions for the All-India three-digit level
data, by the method described in Bhalotra (1998b), setting the coecient
and standard error on the second lag dependent variable to be zero, as this is
absent in LSDV-BC regressions. We also note that all the elasticities except
that of the mandays are signicant.
Table 8 tries to explain employment growth in the textile industry using
long run elasticities of employment to wage, capital, manhours and output
and their average annual growth rates. We note that in both Capital- Con-
strained (CCEM) and Output-Constrained (OCEM) Employment Models,
though growth in wages alone has contributed quite a high part of fall in
employment, almost an equal but positive contribution of growth in capital
and output, rendering major part of fall in employment unexplained by these
major variables, suggests that various other factors including trade liberal-
isation and environmental regulations have in
uenced employment growth
in the textile industry.
In order to analyse a few interesting basic policy issues in the Indian
textile industry, it is imperative to look at the handlooms and powerlooms
sub-sectors in isolation. We further note that it would be also useful to anal-
yse the sub-sectors that are likely to be directly in
uenced by environmental
regulations. These are the wet-processing sectors, which fall under ve NIC-
87 categories.37 The results have not reported although available from the
authors shows that: in the khadi and handlooms sector employment is not
wage-dependent and is rather infulenced by capital, output and other fac-
tors. We also obtain positive signicant eect of MFA quota utilisation as
well as the initiation of phasing out of MFA quotas, negative eect of envi-
ronmental regulations and positive eect of ban on azo dyes.38 The results
of the powerloom sub-sector indicate that the signs of almost all coecients
37We perform both the system-GMM and bias-corrected within-group estimation.
38This is interesting and well-justiable because Khadi, handloom and other traditional
sectors do not use azo dyes and hence could be benetted by this ban.
26are identical to those in the previous results.39
We also obtain that for the polluting sectors, domestic environmental
regulation has a positive eect on employment, while the external ban on azo
dyes has no signicant eect. This seems to suggest that the environmental
regulations might have either improved the eciency of the entire process,
thereby enhancing output and employment or that the employment might
have risen owing to an increased requirement of manpower in order to comply
with these regulations.40
Absence of an explicit measure of labour regulation warrants for the test
for the robustness of the result that labour regulation aects employment
using dierent measures. Here we use the data for number of lockouts41
by the industries owing to their inability to pay their workers and unrest
demonstrated by the workers in terms of mandays lost in strikes. Table 9
shows the results. Most results in this exercise are similar to those in the
previous ones. However, there are three interesting inferences in place.
Firstly, the lockouts in
uence employment positively. This may be be-
cause of the possibility that the exit of huge sick industries might have paved
way to the opening of new ecient small ones, which enhance employment
as observed in Roy (1998b).42 Secondly, labour unrest aects employment
negatively as it is expected apriori , since persistent strikes may pave way
to ring of workers on disciplinary grounds. Thirdly, wages are insignicant
in all specications in this table, which means one or more of the follow-
ing: During the period between 1984-85 and 1997-98, employment in textile
sector has been wage-independent; or, controlling for the labour unrest and
lockouts, wages have insignicant eects on employment, implying that fall
in employment cannot be attributed to rise in wages as much as to the other
factors considered in this study; or, the eect of wages on employment actu-
ally works through the unions, whose behaviour may be re
ected in labour
unrest and lockouts, rendering the eects of wages per se insignicant.
39This is based on Prais and Winsten (1954) estimator.
40Though there is no empirical support for this, it should be noted that the Environment
Act (1986) requires the large-scale polluting industries to set up an `Euent Treatment
Plant', which in turn, would need some people to establish and run.
41It is interesting to note that Besley and Burgess (2004) nd a postive correlation
between the measure of labour regulation index, strikes and lockouts.
42Possibly, sick mills could have rendered many people unemployed because of the in-
eciency factor that could restrain the industry from operating at its frontier, in which
case it could have employed more people.
277 Conclusion
This paper attempts to examine the role played by various factors on em-
ployment in organized textile industry using data from India and her states.
We document existence of employment rigidity, negative eect of wages, pos-
itive eect of demand shock indicating a counter-cyclical markup, positive
eect of 1991 reforms, positive eect of domestic environmental regulation
and negative eect of external ban on Azo dyes on employment. Our results
are robust to the disaggregation to state-level data. The state-level results,
in addition, shows that increase in the manhours worked has been at the
cost of fall in employment, positive eect of trade liberalisation in terms of
falling customs duties, rise in MFA quota utilisation as well as phasing out
of MFA quotas and negative eect of labour regulation on employment.
Further, an analysis in isolation of the pollution-intensive industries
seems to support Porter's hypothesis, indicating that environmental reg-
ulations might enhance the eciency of process, thereby increasing output
and employment. However, the external ban on azo dyes exerts a negative
impact on the employment of the industry as a whole, though it has had
no impact on the pollution-intensive ones. Moreover, its positive eect on
employment in handloom sector suggests that industries that have already
complied with the ban by their inherent nature, might perform well because
of it. An examination of powerloom sector and handloom sector shows that
employment in these sectors were also signicantly positively enhanced by
trade liberalisation. Powerloom sector seems to be characterised by the in-
dependence of employment with respect to output, wages and capital, while
that in handlooms is wage-independent.
Given the results of this empirical exercise, we can infer that the em-
ployment in the Indian textile sector, encompassing all its sub-sectors, is
poised to increase in a post-MFA regime. The environmental regulations
need not aect the employment in future and the possible job loss might be
compensated by the job requirements arising from the compliance to these
regulations. Hence, employment should not be a concern in implementing
environmental standards and regulations in the textile sector. Further, poli-
cies that enhance trade liberalisation and labour exibility are required to
promote employment in the textile industry in India.
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34TABLES
Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rates in the Organised Indian Textile
Sector (1993-94 prices)
Period Output Employment Real Wages Real Fixed Capital Stock
1961-62 to 1970-71 5.034 0.496 2.487 3.645
1971-72 to 1980-81 6.668 3.295 2.882 4.643
1981-82 to 1990-91 8.174 -0.968 5.44 8.802
1991-92 to 1999-2000 6.718 0.997 2.378 17.774
1980-81 to 1997-98 5.34 -5.17 5.35 8.11
Source: Author's Calculations based on the ASI data
Table 2: Features of Employment, Capital and Output (1993-94 prices)
Year Y/K K/N Y/N
1973-74 2.569 4.523 11.616
1980-81 3.657 4.364 15.958
1985-86 3.092 7.331 22.664
1990-91 3.614 10.332 37.336
1997-98 1.546 34.122 52.760
Source: Author's Calculations based on the ASI data
35Table 3: Capital-Constrained Model: All-India Three-Digit Data.
Dependent Variable: lognit
Variable 1 2 3 4 LSDV-BC
lognit 1 0.646***(0.000) 0.601***(0.006) 0.382**(0.012) 0.606***(0.001) 0.612***(0.000)
lognit 2 0.203*(0.088) 0.228(0.131) 0.456***(0.003) 0.274*(0.075)
dlogyit 0.324***(0.000) 0.349***(0.000) 0.328***(0.003) 0.321***(0.004) 0.193***(0.000)
dlogyit 1 0.175*(0.065) 0.228*(0.056) 0.185*(0.075) 0.094(0.438) 0.023(0.513)
dlogyit 2 0.005(0.949) 0.018(0.838) -0.010(0.775) -0.038(0.522) 0.022(0.355)
logkit 0.226***(0.000) 0.180**(0.031) 0.210**(0.013) 0.186**(0.018) 0.361***(0.000)
logkit 1 -0.251**(0.033) -0.260*(0.068) 0.019(0.788) -0.046(0.45) -0.102***(0.000)
logkit 2 0.085(0.229) 0.127(0.389) -0.071(0.438) -0.0095(0.87) 0.024(0.372)
logwit -0.457**(0.024) -0.430**(0.018) -0.290**(0.049) 0.003(0.994) -0.186***(0.000)
logwit 1 0.240(0.224) 0.210(0.477) -0.343(0.214) -0.300(0.426) 0.129*(0.051)












Year Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes
Group Dummies Yes Yes No No No
cons 0.400(0.279) 0.288(0.527) 0.204(0.429) -0.012(0.891)
Hansen's statistic 15.410(1.000) 12.06(1.000) 10.480(1.000) 7.6(1)
AR(1) -3.010***(0.003) -2.9***(0.004) -2.110**(0.035) -2.49**(0.013) 53.342***(0.000)
AR(2) -0.230(0.817) -0.38(0.702) -1.390(0.163) 0.36(0.722)
Note: *,** and *** denote signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% Levels of Signif-
icance, respectively. Figures within parentheses are p-values.
36Table 4: Output-Constrained Model: All-India Three-Digit Data.
Dependent Variable: lognit
Variable 1 2 3 4 LSDV-BC
lognit 1 0.367***(0.004) 0.523***(0.000) 0.203(0.190) 0.417*(0.053) 0.438***(0.000)
lognit 2 0.514***(0.000) 0.417***(0.008) 0.283***(0.007) 0.382(0.119)
dlogyit 0.289**(0.021) 0.558***(0.000) 0.156(0.345) 0.520***(0.000) 0.106***(0.011)
dlogyit 1 0.343***(0.001) 0.266**(0.013) 0.150*(0.063) 0.036(0.897) -0.058*(0.062)
dlogyit 2 -0.026(0.789) -0.016(0.869) -0.022(0.365)
logyit 0.146(0.248) 0.361**(0.044) 0.429***(0.000)
logyit 1 0.047(0.553) 0.206**(0.011)
logyit 2
logwit 0.087(0.751) -0.236*(0.083) -0.335**(0.032) 0.0001(0.999) -0.230***(0.000)
logwit 1 -0.415(0.208) -0.037(0.867) -0.181(0.249) 0.186(0.819) 0.058(0.384)





polln1 -0.358*(0.055) -0.257*(0.086) -0.088(0.418)
envreg1 0.287(0.109) 0.350(0.110) 0.340*(0.076)
ref 0.042**(0.038) 0.030(0.209) 0.031(0.175)




Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Group Dummies No No Yes No No
cons -0.354(0.300) 0.141(0.707) 0.475(0.324) 0.153(0.470)
Hansen's statistic 10.730(1.000) 18.590(1.000) 13.570(1.000) 19.760(1.000)
AR(1) -2.360**(0.018) -2.380**(0.017) -2.070**(0.038) -1.700*(0.090) 91.6***(0.000)
AR(2) -1.310(0.189) -0.570(0.567) -0.950(0.344) -0.370(0.714)
Note: *,** and *** denote signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% Levels of Signif-
icance, respectively. Figures within parentheses are P-values.
37Table 5: Capital-Constrained Model: State-wise Two-Digit Data.
Dependent Variable: lognit
Variable 1 2 3 4
lognit 1 0.599***(0) 0.577***(0) 0.717***(0.010) 0.238*(0.086)
lognit 2 0.299***(0.001) 0.265***(0.067) 0.145(0.193) 0.167**(0.036)
logwit -0.182***(0.012) -0.214***(0.005) -0.210***(0.002) -0.093***(0.002)
logwit 1 0.189***(0) 0.167***(0.004) 0.209***(0.002) 0.050*(0.093)
logwit 2 0.0465(0.521) 0.032(0.714) -0.038(0.526) 0.022*** (0.022)
logkit 0.218***(0.01) 0.176** (0.027) 0.249***(0.001) 0.049*** (0.002)
logkit 1 -0.1133(0.267) -0.081(0.426) -0.115(0.118) -0.030(0.113)
logkit 2 -0.0634(0.391) -0.021(0.698) -0.034(0.565) 0.002(0.907)
dlogyit 0.282(0.1o8) 0.402***(0.002) 0.316***(0.007) -0.012(0.507)
dlogyit 1 0.06* (0.066) 0.236(0.116) 0.087(0.227) -0.007(0.625)












Year Dummies No Yes No No
Sector Dummies No No Yes No
State Dummies No No No No
cons 0.4946 (0.116) -0.0111(0.943) 0.088(0.713) -0.358***(0.003)
Hansen's statistic 33 (0.992) 32.87 (0.992) 30.12 (0.998) 28.99(1)
AR(1) -2.36** (0.018) -2.26** (0.024) -2.53** (0.011) -3.01*** (0.004)
AR(2) -1.29 (0.198) -1.13 (0.26) -1.59 (0.112) -0.81(0.417)
Note: *,** and *** denote signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% Levels of Signif-
icance, respectively. Figures within parentheses are p-values.
38Table 6: Output-Constrained model: State-wise Two-Digit Data.
Dependent Variable: lognit
Variable 1 2 3 4
lognit 1 0.240**(0.012) 0.173(0.142) 0.176(0.192) 0.566***(0.000)
lognit 2 0.197***(0.002) 0.153*(0.08) 0.261*(0.09) 0.272***(0.009)
logwit -0.081***(0.001) -0.077***(0.001) -0.104***(0.003) -0.112(0.147)
logwit 1 0.046*(0.052) 0.037*(0.085) 0.042(0.158) 0.181***(0.000)
logwit 2 0.031***(0.000) 0.023*(0.055) 0.034*(0.092) 0.036(0.538)
logyit 0.011(0.584) -0.004(0.784) -0.017(0.461) 0.389***(0.000)
logyit 1
logyit 2 0.007(0.79) 0.016(0.315) 0.033(0.184) -0.328***(0.000)
dlogyit -0.002(0.952) -0.003(0.898) 0.03(0.247)
dlogyit 1 -0.219*(0.059)
dlogyit 2 0.01(0.319) 0.01(0.469) 0.01(0.465) 0.055(0.333)
loghit 0.394***(0) 0.405***(0) 0.399***(0)
loghit 1 -0.093**(0.013) -0.066(0.143) -0.067(0.195)









Year Dummies No No Yes Yes
Sector Dummies No Yes No No
cons -0.244**(0.035) -0.405***(0.004) -0.386***(0.012) 0.898**(0.016)
Hansen's statistic 22.86(1) 22.74(1) 9.800(1) 32.88(0.99)
AR(1) -3.36***(0.001) -2.94***(0.003) -2.49**(0.013) -2.46**(0.014)
AR(2) -0.81(0.419) -0.63(0.526) -0.98(0.329) -1.36(0.174)
Note: *,** and *** denote signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% Levels of Signif-
icance, respectively. Figures within parentheses are p-values.
39Table 7: Average Estimates of the Long-run Elasticities (LRE) of Employ-
ment with respect to Dierent Variables




Demand Shock 1.040***(3.470) 0.928***(7.953)
Output 0.777***(5.561)
Manhours -0.026(-0.166) -0.056(-0.853)
Adjustment Speed 1.633***(14.952) 2.478***(6.171)
Note: *,** and *** denote signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% Levels of Signif-
icance, respectively. Figures within parentheses are t-statistics.
Table 8: Contribution of major variables to the average annual growth rate
of employment based on long-run elasticities
Explained Explained Explained Explained Explained Actual Explained
Rate by , Rate by K Rate by W Rate by H Rate by Y Growth Rate by
W, H & Rate other
Model K or Y of N variables
CCEM 0.497 7.023 -6.504 -0.022 -5.167 -5.664
OCEM -0.277 -4.379 -0.048 4.149 -5.167 -4.890
40Table 9: Alternate models with All-India Three-Digit data using lockouts
and unrest (1984-85 - 1997-98).
Dependent variable: lognit
Variables 1 2 3 4
lognit 1 0.599***(0.002) 0.718*(0.065) 0.487***(0.000) 0.367***(0.007)
lognit 2 0.221(0.183) 0.084(0.849) 0.215(0.122) 0.396**(0.019)
logwit 0.187(0.552) -0.103(0.77) 0.088(0.746) -0.084(0.741)
logwit 1 0.201(0.243) 0.357(0.353) -0.338(0.358) -0.075(0.769)







dlogyit 0.415***(0.000) 0.275(0.156) 0.616***(0.000) 0.410***(0.000)
dlogyit 1 0.123(0.411) 0.093(0.762) 0.386***(0.000) 0.245**(0.043)










lockout 0.013*(0.056) 0.025**(0.013) 0.017**(0.027) 0.014**(0.039)
unrest -0.002**(0.028) -0.004*(0.051) -0.002*(0.058) -0.001**(0.047)
cons 0.769*(0.099) 0.377(0.329) 0.283(0.141) 0.362(0.135)
Hansen's Test Statistic 18.64(1) 10.73(1) 17.15(1) 20.52(1)
AR(1) -2.35**(0.019) -1.79*(0.073) -2.33**(0.02) -1.9*(0.057)
AR(2) 0.12(0.904) 0.41(0.681) 0.31(0.754) -0.58(0.561)
Note: *,** and *** denote signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% Levels of Signif-
icance, respectively. Figures within parentheses are p-values.
41